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GETTING THE CAMEL OUT OF THE TENT: BEHIND THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION'S RISE TO
POWER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STATES' CONTINUED
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
SAMUEL R. BRUMBERG*
The federal camel has a tendency to occupy perma-
nently any state tent. That may be a wise course; but
if so, Congress should make the decision.'
* Samuel R. Brumberg is a J.D. candidate at the William and Mary School of
Law. He received a B.A. degree summa cum laude from the University of
Richmond in Political Science, graduating Phi Beta Kappa and Omicron Delta
Kappa. Having served as the Managing Editor of the Review this year, the
author has many people to thank. He would like to thank, first, his fiancee,
Jessica Aber, also a student at the Law School, for her patience and
understanding during the entire year-long publication process. Also, his parents,
Charles and Laraine Brumberg, are deserving of thanks for similar reasons. The
constant patience and support of the author's family and friends were crucial in
the author's making it to the present day. Finally, the author thanks Jan Abbott,
the Review's administrative assistant, for her indefatigable ability to forbear
even the most difficult of requests and schedules, Stephen McDonald, the Editor-
in-Chief of the Review, Brian Hendricks, the Executive Editor of the Review,
and, in the words of Mr. Hendricks, the entire staff of the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review, "for their tireless work, attention to
detail, and unrelenting professionalism." Brian Hendricks, In Pursuit of
Environmental Regulatory Compliance: Should We Flex the "Public Trust"
Enhancement Muscle?, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 153, 153 (2005).
' Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 476 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). This quote begins Cassandra Burke Robertson's 2001
Article on state and federal power over electricity transmission. The quote also
begins this Note, for the issues that Ms. Robertson raised in 2001 have not yet
been resolved and have grown ever more cloudy and troublesome in the past
four years. The federal camel has now fully invaded the state tent, and does not
seem content to leave anytime soon. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Note, Bringing the Camel Into the Tent: State and Federal Power Over Electricity
Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71 (2001) (covering in detail the jurisdictional
problems facing FERC and the states).
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INTRODUCTION
State public utility commissions should control electric
transmission regulation. In recent years, states have embraced a
precarious federalization: new policy involving Independent
System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations
("RTOs").2 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 and Federal Energy
Regulation Commission ("FERC") orders implementing that Act
have left states with jurisdictional quandaries.3 For the moment,
FERC is filling in the holes, and the states are left with fundamen-
tal problems such as whether to try to remain active in light of a
2 Independent System Operators, or ISOs, are the "referees" of electricity
transmission. One definition states, "the ISO is the FERC regulated control area
operator of the ISO transmission grid. Its responsibilities include providing non-
discriminatory access to the grid, managing congestion, maintaining the
reliability and security of the grid, and providing billing and trading settlement
services. The ISO has no affiliation with any market participant." CalISO,
Glossary of Terms-The California ISO, http://www.caiso.com/aboutus/glossary
(last visited Apr. 14, 2006) [hereinafter "CalISO Glossary of Terms"]. The ISOs
are not to be confused with, but often operate hand-in-hand with, the RTOs (also
known as "RTGs"). The RTOs, as opposed to being independent "referees" or "bus
drivers" of sorts, operate as consortia or "teams" of utilities that pool their
resources and operational control of their transmission networks. Id. They are
"voluntary organization [s] of transmission owners and users who act as a forum
to report to the FERC on the implementation of open access to transmission
systems." Id. ISOs may come together to form RTOs, which are generally
thought of as larger, regional groups. See FERC, Regional Transmission
Organization Region Map, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/
rto-map.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). However, many areas have only ISOs
covering a state or a portion of a state, as opposed to RTOs covering multi-state
regions. Id. Some RTOs and ISOs also form even larger organizations to
integrate and coordinate policies across an entire interconnection, such as SSG-
WI, a "discussion forum for facilitating the creation of a Seamless Western
Market and for proposing resolutions for issues associated with differences in
RTO practices and procedures." Seams Steering Group-Western
Interconnection, Home Page, http://www.ssg-wi.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
The SSI-WI group is made up of the California ISO, the West Connect RTO,
covering Arizona, New Mexico, and other states, and the GridWest RTO,
covering Washington, Oregon, and up into Canada. See id.
' See infra Parts I.G., II, & III.
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federal regulatory behemoth or to watch their power and influence
over transmission policy diminish.4 Some argue that a regime of
almost total federal regulation would end the problems associated
with limitations on transmission access.5 In large part, the federal
government has already taken major steps to federalize the
nation's transmission policy through the use of RTOs.6 However,
the nation deserves a chance to determine whether the states can
handle electric transmission policymaking and regulation, as
Congress originally intended when it first proposed federal control
over the electricity industry.7 Recently, constitutional concerns
have arisen after state governments gave permission to incumbent
franchised utilities to turn over operational control of the transmis-
sion systems to RTOs, while at the same time trying to protect
retail in-state buyers of electricity.'
This Note will argue that, whatever the condition of
transmission policy at the regional or national level, the state
governments and specifically the state public utilities commissions
are the most qualified bodies to decide transmission policy such as
siting9 and access issues. These bodies are best equipped to
maintain equity in the face of concerns over "native load" protec-
tion.' This proposal is especially true given the increasing push to
' See id.
'See infra Part III.
6 See FERC Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Dec. 20, 1999) codified at 18
C.F.R. § 35.
' In the Act creating the FERC, the Federal Power Act of 1935, Congress
anticipated that the FERC's power (the predecessor to FERC was the FPC, the
Federal Power Commission) would be small and used to fill gaps in regulation
that extended beyond state lines. Federal jurisdiction was to extend "only to
those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." 16 U.S.C.
824(a) (2001); see also Robertson, supra note 1 at 73. A discussion of Congress's
intent appears infra Part II.B.
8 See Ky. Power Co. v. Huelsmann, 352 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2005). A
detailed discussion of this case appears infra Part IV.
9 Transmission line "siting" refers to the land use procedure of deciding where
electric transmission lines should be located and how and under what
circumstances they should be placed. It may involve the use of eminent domain
powers. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
'0 "Native load" refers to an end-user customer or device using electricity.
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move the nation's power grid to a regionally-based system of
RTOs. 1 In her article, New Power, Few New Lines: A Need for a
Federal Solution,2 Hoang Dang argues that a federal solution is
needed because "FERC believes that transmission congestion is
largely due to persistent discrimination by public utility monopo-
lies reluctant to share their transmission lines with wholesale
competitors." 3 FERC, however, exaggerates the role of discrimina-
tion; 4 the process of discrimination itself may even be fair. This
Note concludes that the States, rather than FERC, should solve
the current problems involving electric transmission.
CalISO Glossary of Terms, supra note 2. These are often retail use
customers-residents and businesses. Id. "Native load" is "load" that is using
electricity that is "native" or geographically close to the generating plant. CalISO
defines load as "an end-use device or an end-use customer that receives power
from the electric system. Load should not be confused with [d]emand, which is
the measure of power that a load receives or requires." Id. A load, then, is an
individual consumer, while demand is the amount of electricity required by that
consumer. Native load refers to that group of consumers or end-users close in
proximity (usually in the same state) to the generating plant. One of the many
concerns of state governments is native load protection, that is, a priority of service
given to customers within that state (the "natives"), ostensibly the very customers
for which the generation capacity (i.e., power plants) in that state was intended.
Native load protection has been one of the key issues in regards to the consti-
tutionality of state statutes and regulations governing that topic. A discussion of
native load appears in Part II. See also note 195 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Advocates, Resolution Promoting Market
Monitoring Functions within Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
Whenever Such Regional Entities Are Created (June 19,2002), IT 1-2, available
at http://www.nascua.org/res/electlelect200203.php.
12 Hoang Dang, New Power, Few New Lines: A Need for a Federal Solution, 17
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 327 (2002).
13 Dang, supra note 12, at 328 (discussing FERC's encouraging RTO
development as a solution to this problem in its Order 2000). The fear of
discrimination against non-incumbent transmission line owners is the driver
behind much of FERC's regulatory expansion over the years. Beginning with the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, FERC's jurisdiction has gradually expanded through
various court opinions and now stands near its apogee, and, should the outcome
of constitutional and preemption challenges to state native load protection
measures come to fruition, FERC's power over transmission will be almost total.
" See infra Part V.B.
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I. BACKGROUND ON ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
A. The Basics
The U.S. electrical system can be divided into three parts:
generation, transmission, and distribution. 5 Generation is the
production of power at a power plant, and is beyond the scope of
this Note.16 Transmission, the next step, will be the focus of this
Note. "Transmission refers to the movement of large currents
over grid systems that can span continents. From the generator,
electrons travel a short distance to a nearby transmission
station where voltage is increased to high levels .... The power
is then sent ... [onto] thick cables supported by high towers."1"
These "interstates for electrons" range from 115kv to 765kv.18
The final step, distribution, is when electricity moves from
substations, which receive power from the transmission lines,
over distribution lines and into the homes and businesses which
need the electricity. 19
"5 Smithsonian Inst., Moving & Using Electrons, http://americanhistory.si.
edu/poweringtransmit/trmain.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). See generally
Smithsonian Inst., Powering a Generation, available at http://american
history.si.edu/powering (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (discussing background
information on the generation of electricity in detail).
16 For more information regarding electric generation, the types of generating
plants, different fuels that can be used in the process, and other elements of
generation, see Smithsonian Inst., Throw The Switch, The Technology of Electric
Power http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
17 Moving & Using Electrons, supra note 15.
id. See generally Smithsonian Inst., What Are Volts?, available at
httpJ/americanhistory.si.edu/powering/basics/volt.htm (last visited Apr. 13,2006).
"Kv" is an abbreviation for "kilovolt(s)," or a measure of power equal to 1,000 volts.
A volt is "a measure of the pressure forcing the current to flow." The larger the volt
measure, the more pressure available to move electric particles. Id.
19 Moving & Using Electrons, supra note 15; see also Smithsonian Inst., What
Happens After Electricity is Made?, http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/
basics/system.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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B. Interconnection
Another important element of the nation's transmission
system is known as the interconnection. The interconnection
"permit[s] a utility to spread its generating plants over a wide
area, and provide regional backup in case of problems at a given
plant."20 Today, virtually all utilities "are tied into an interconnec-
tion, allowing each to rely on the others."'" This interconnection is
both practical and economical. "Instead of individual utilities
having to build extra generators to cover routine or emergency
shut-downs, they can readily buy power from each other as needed
via the interconnection."22 This process of buying and selling of
power has been a great impetus for the RTO,23 while a decline in
regulatory oversight by the States has hindered the development
of RTOs.24
There are also several practical implications of the RTO and
the making of interconnections. The nation's transmission system
is surprisingly fragile.25 Falling victim to sagging,26 wind and
weather,2 7 a low tolerance for instability,28 and the wear of time,29
transmission systems must be rigorously maintained, and the




23 See Dang, supra note 12, at 338-39.
24 Id.
25 See Moving & Using Electrons, supra note 15.
26 Sagging occurs when more power is forced through a line and its temperature
rises. As the temperature rises, the line expands, and "sags" between the towers. Id.
27 Wind and weather take their toll on the transmission lines. "Even the sun can
play havoc with transmission systems, as solar flares induce large currents in
grids." Id.
28 "Generators connected to a common grid must be kept in synchronous
operation to maintain the 60hz frequency."Id. "[Glrid [s] must remain constantly
energized to meet consumer demand." Id. "Instabilities in the system, if not
corrected, can cause it to collapse and result in a blackout." Id.
29 "Over time, expansion and contraction can cause lines to wear out." Moving &
Using Electrons, supra note 15.
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weakness of one system could potentially threaten transmission
grids well beyond its immediate geographic area.3" Proper safe-
guards must be put in place to keep the weaknesses in one com-
pany's transmission system from flooding over into others.3 ' This is
where state governments might have a competitive regulatory edge.
Professor Koch describes transmission as follows:
[E]nvision a person in Spain buying a cup of water
from someone in the United States. The seller in the
United States must deliver the water by dropping it
in the Atlantic Ocean. To receive the delivery, the
purchaser in Spain then dips into the Atlantic Ocean
to withdraw the cup of water. The seller delivered a
cup of water into the system and the purchaser
withdrew a cup of water, but in no sense can either
party identify the particular molecules of water that
were the subject of their market transaction. The
transportation of the seller's cup never literally
occurs, and the cup withdrawn actually comes from
an unidentifiable source, which in all probability is
not the seller.
Similarly, a generator plant adds unidentifiable units
of electricity to the flow from which a consumer
extracts electricity for personal use. The generator
plant's agreement to supply the consumer with
electricity can be honored only in the most artificial
sense. Adding to this artificiality is the fiction that a
particular unit of electricity is transported and
301d.
3' The northeast blackout of August 2003 is a good example of how the
interconnection can be detrimental. Individual companies were not able to
isolate themselves from the effects of FirstEnergy's problems, and thus, many
states were affected by a problem with a single company's transmission system.
See, e.g., Wis. Power Systems Eng. Research Ctr., Excerpts from "A Timeline of
the 2003 Blackout,"available at http://www.pserc.wisc.edu/Timeline.pdf (case
sensitive) (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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transmitted directly to the user. In actuality, the
consumed unit may have traveled any number of
routes from any number of sources to the consumer.32
C. Understanding Deregulation & PURPA
To understand the federal-state dynamic of the current
transmission regime, one must have a rudimentary understanding
of electric deregulation in the United States. Federal regulation of
energy had always been around to some degree, but the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") of 197833 was the first
comprehensive federal regime governing the way that the nation
produced and used electricity.3
PURPA had four main components with several major
consequences. First, promotional rate structures, which encour-
aged higher levels of consumer consumption,3 5 were eliminated
except when they could be financially justified by electric
utilities.36 Second, PURPA put in place incentives for companies to
"co-generate." 37 Co-generation "required utility companies to
purchase power from industrial companies that produced electric-
ity as a by-product of other activities. In other words, a paper
company that needed steam would.., produce some electricity for
use in the factory."" PURPA required excess electricity, above
what the paper company could use for its internal process, to be
" Charles H. Koch, Sr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations
in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 572 (2000).
" Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117 (1978).
3" Smithsonian Inst., The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, available at
http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/past/h4main.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2006) [hereinafter PURPA].
11 For example, promotional rate structures would charge a high initial fee for,
hypothetically, the first 50kWh of electricity used, but a lower fee for subsequent





GETTING THE CAMEL OUT OF THE TENT
purchased by utilities and used instead of wasted.3 9 The third
major component of PURPA was the encouragement of the
development of gas turbine technology.4" Natural gas, cleaner to
burn than coal, also provided a greater thermal efficiency. Natural
gas produced power directly from a gas turbine, likened to an
aircraft engine that produces electricity, and also by using excess
heat from the process burning to heat steam to generate electricity
on a traditional steam turbine.4 "By the early 1990s, gas turbine
cogeneration units could be installed quickly and obtain thermal
efficiencies in the 50% range-well above that achieved by central
station utility plants."42 Finally, PURPA put in place great
incentives for the use of alternative energy. Alternative energy,
such as energy from wind, hydroelectric, and solar power, and from
other non-fossil-fuel resources, was developed as a result of the
PURPA legislation.43 Prices fell and efficiencies rose." As a result
of PURPA, California "had become the home of 85% of the world's
capacity of electricity powered by the wind and 95% of the world's
solar-powered electricity."45
"Overall, PURPA provided a tremendous and unanticipated
spur to technological innovation for numerous non-traditional
technologies for producing electricity."46 Important consequences
of PURPA laid the groundwork for the deregulated environment
that we see in the electric utility industry today. Utilities that
were already fairly monopolistic became entrenched as natural
monopolies and became vertically integrated.47
"Even before utility companies won designation as natural
monopolies, they had established themselves as vertically inte-
grated firms. [T]hey undertook all the functions of generating,
transmitting, and distributing electricity to the ultimate cus-
39Id.






46 See PURPA, supra note 34.
47 id.
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tomer."" As utility regulation took hold, the monopolies of utility
companies reflected a fixed entrenchment.4 9 The alternative, under
PURPA, was that non-utility companies, so-called Non-Utility
Generators ("NUGs"), were able to compete in the generation
market with traditional utility companies.5 0 This was one of the
first footholds of modern deregulation.
After PURPA's consequences were fully known, many in the
energy community began to question the traditional natural
monopoly structure in which most utilities operated.5 '
Congressmen and members of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the body that has authority
over interstate transactions of electricity, [believed
that electric generation was no longer a natural
monopoly]. In short, the existence and success of
PURPA [including the proliferation of NUGs] ap-
peared to destroy one important justification for
regulation of utilities.52
D. Modern Economics and Deregulation
The push to deregulate traditional utility monopolies began
in the 1980s with the deregulation of the banking, trucking,
natural gas, and telecommunications industries.5 3 PURPA laid the
groundwork for deregulation, and amendments in the 1980s
completed the process in earnest.54
In classical economic theory, competition among





51 PURPA, supra note 34.
5 2 id.
" Smithsonian Inst., Market Economics: The Push for Deregulation,
http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/past/history5.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2006) [hereinafter Market Economics].
1 Id.
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and a flurry of innovation among sellers to provide
new services and goods. Overall, society benefited
from a free competitive market as resources were
used and allocated efficiently. In the energy realm,
advocates of the free market expected economic
efficiency to yield energy efficiency as well.55
"Wheeling," or the opening of an incumbent utility's
transmission lines to competitors,5 6 allowed NUGs and smaller
utilities to sell power across the country.57 This, in many ways,
indicated a need for further federal regulation. "Under the new
approach, independents could contract to sell power to distant
purchasers and use the transmission lines of several utilities (for
a reasonable fee) to get the power to them.""
E. The Energy Policy Act of 1992"9
The original purpose of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was
to introduce wholesale competition into the electric industry.6" This
55 Id.
56 This could be equated to "unbundling" in the telecommunications industry,
wherein an incumbent carrier is forced by operation of law to lease to its
competitor at wholesale rates that portion of the line needed for the competitive
carrier's network. See Robert W. Crandall, Symposium: Antitrust: The Remedy
for the "Bottleneck Monopoly" in Telecom: Isolate It, Share It, or Ignore It, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 3, 17, nn.37-38 (2005).
, See Market Economics, supra note 53.
58Id. See infra note 62 and accompanying text for discussion of this reasonable fee.
5 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992)
[hereinafter EPAct]. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was a massive piece of
legislation, addressing energy efficiency (everything from utility energy
generation to energy efficient lighting and buildings, appliances, and
equipment), federal agency energy management, alternative fuels, electric motor
vehicles, wholesale generation, and amendments to the Federal Power Act.
Those amendments are chiefly at issue here, as they were an attempt to
introduce wholesale competition into the electric utility industry. See Robertson,
supra note 1 at 75.
60 Robertson, supra note 1 at 75. The EPAct also addressed radioactive waste,
uranium enrichment and associated environmental, health and safety issues,
renewable energy, clean coal technology, the strategic petroleum reserve, octane
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was done through the wheeling process,6 ' for which the issue of
non-discrimination was pivotal. The legislation called for FERC to
require utilities to ensure open access through "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory, cost-based rates."62 The open access provisions
of the bill were achieved through the use of Open Access Transmis-
sion Tarriffs, or OATTs, ordered by FERC in Order 888.63
F. Order 888
Order 888 was issued by the FERC on April 24, 1996.6 The
wheeling provisions of Order 888 allowed NUGs to wheel electric-
ity over incumbent transmission owners' lines at a uniform
wholesale rate.65 Gone were the discriminatory pricing practices in
place before the Order's issuance.6 The pricing scheme imagined
by FERC was one where transmission lines would be open "to
competing electricity generators at the same price as the utility
would charge its own affiliate."67 This resulted in a "functional
display and disclosure (for example, on commercial retail gasoline pumps), oil
and gas pipeline policy, hydro-electric power, and nuclear plant licensing. See
EPAct, 106 Stat. at 2276-82.
61 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing wheeling).
6 2 Koch, supra note 32, at 577 n.40. The EPAct "required the FERC to force utilities
to deliver power from generators to other utilities and electricity wholesalers at
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, cost-based rates. This legislative mandate led the
FERC to issue its open access rule, Order 888." Id. (citations omitted).
63 See id.
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996);
F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 31,036 (1996); see also Order on Reh'g, Order
No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (1997); F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations IT
31,048, 31,780-83 (1997).
65 See id.; see also Robertson, supra note 1, at 75-76.66 Id.
67 Robertson, supra note 1, at 75. This would not eliminate the requirement for
a 'reasonable fee,' but rather would make the fee equal to that which an
incumbent utility would charge an affiliate or subsidiary company.
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unbundling,"68 of the transmission system from the incumbent
utility. Order 888 requires that utilities:
File open-access, nondiscriminatory tariffs that
contain minimum terms and conditions ofnondiscrimi-
natory services prescribed by FERC through its pro
forma tariff; take transmission service for their own,
new wholesale sales and purchases of electric energy
under the same terms and conditions as they offer that
service to others; develop and maintain a same-time
information system that will give potential and
existing transmission users the same access to trans-
mission information that the utility enjoys .. .; and
State separate rates for wholesale generation, trans-
mission and ancillary services.69
Cassandra Robertson indicates that Order 888 assumes that
FERC has jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission."° This
assumption has profound effects on the powers that FERC has to
reach into the electricity market and affect not only the utility and
non-utility generators, but also retail consumers. This jurisdic-
tional territory had previously been untouched by the federal
government.7' FERC's power as determined by court interpretation
reaches far beyond Congress's original intent.72
68 
"[F]unctional unbundling" is a term Robertson uses to describe "the separation
of a utility's transmission function from its 'wholesale electricity merchant
function."' Robertson, supra note 1, at 75-76. Functional unbundling results in
separate price quotations for generation service versus transmission service,
wholesale transmission service under an open access transmission tariff (or
OATT), and a market equalization due to an imposed equality of information,
through a same-time information system for transmission data called OASIS,
the Open Access Same-Time Information System. See id at 76 n.27.
69Id. at 76 (citingState Commissions Ask Supreme Court to Review FERC Order
888, UTIL. INDUS. LITIG. REP., Dec. 2000, available at LEXIS News Library,
ALLNEWS file).
70 Robertson, supra note 1, at 75-76.
71 Under the Federal Power Act, Congress intended for the States to be the
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G. The Regional Transmission Organizations & FERC Order
2000
The wave of the future, along with burgeoning federal
control, is the RTO. The RTO not only provides a single source of
control over a previously monopolistic electric utility's transmission
lines, but also a marketplace for the exchange of energy for sale. The
RTO was established as a "voluntary" participatory organization
under FERC's Order 2000. 73 The benefits of RTOs were to include a
consolidation of control leading to a more ordered transmission
system, increased efficiency, management of congested traffic,
reduced costs, and benefits accruing to the States and to the
environment. 74 "All of these improvements," states FERC, "will help
improve power market performance, which will ultimately result in
lower prices to the Nation's electricity consumers."75
FERC's system shifts operational control from existing
utilities to the RTO. The RTO, now centrally headquartered
potentially hundreds of miles from the native generating and
transmitting capacity of the state-regulated incumbent utilities, will
control the transmission grid which, for many utilities, often spans
a large number of states.76 Order 2000 mandates that "'all public
utilities . . . that own, operate or control interstate transmission
facilities' file with the Commission... a proposal for an RTO... or,
alternatively, a description of efforts to participate in an RTO, any
existing obstacles to RTO participation, and any plans to work
towards RTO participation."77 In Order 2000,78 the FERC orders
" See Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64
Fed. Reg. 31,390 (June 10, 1999), F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations 32,541
(1999) [hereinafter Order 2000]. Note that CalISO also defines the RTO as "a
voluntary organization." CalISO Glossary of Terms, supra note 2.
14 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 77.
75 Id. (quoting 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285; 1999 FERC LEXIS 2692, *114 (1999)).
76 See supra note 2.
77 Robertson, supra note 1, at 77 (quoting Order 2000).
78 Order 2000 states that "[e]ach public utility that owns, operates, or controls
facilities for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce is
required to form and participate in an RTO." See Regional Transmission
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direct participation in RTO planning.79 FERC effectively was
ordering at least some measure of participation but calling this a
voluntary process. Contrary to the claims of FERC, this process is
not voluntary.0 Present evidence bears this out. This author is not
now aware of any large incumbent utility not actively participating
in, or seeking to participate in, an RTO scheme.
The nation now has several RTOs and ISOs designed to
serve most of the populated areas of the United States, many of
which also interconnect with Canadian electric systems.8 ' The
push to adopt RTOs permeates almost every state, with many
state legislatures now mandating membership for their existing
electric utilities.8 2
II. THE CAMEL IS IN THE TENT, AND WE KNEW IT ALL ALONG
A. Introduction
In the recent case of Kentucky Power Co. v. Huelsmann,8 3 a
federal district court ruled unconstitutional Kentucky's accession
to its incumbent utility, Kentucky Power Co., joining PJM
Organizations, Final Rule, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285, Order No. 2000, Docket No.
RM99-2-000 (Dec. 20, 1999), at 1.
79 Id.
80 In fact, "[oln July 12, 2001, [FERC] issued four orders directing three [ISOs]
in the Northeast to participate in a mediation proceeding concerning the
formation of a single regional transmission organization (citation omitted). The
Commission announced in this decision that the Northeast was a single, natural
market, with significant and growing interregional trading"(citation omitted).
Charles Pratt, Re-Inventing New York's Power Plant Siting Law, 6 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 3 n.37 (2001); see also Stephen P. Sherwin, Comment,
Deregulation of Electricity in New York: A Continuing Odyssey 1996-2001, 12
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 263, 305-06, nn.295-96 (discussing the New York ISO's
entry into talks to develop a northeastern RTO).
"1 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Existing and Proposed RTOs and
ISOs (Map), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-
map.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).82 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56-577 (2004); see infra note 195.
83 See Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
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Interconnection, L.L.C., one RTO covering Kentucky.' The most
recent problem with states trying to maintain some measure of
control over electric transmission regulation is one of constitution-
ality. However, the ballooning power of FERC dates back to
earlier days. 6 As with many issues of governing at the federal
level, the problem appears to be the definition of "interstate
commerce."
87
B. The Birth and Rise of FERC
FERC derives its power from the Federal Power Act, which
states in pertinent part that
[iut is hereby declared that the business of transmit-
ting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribu-
tion to the public is affected with a public interest,
and that Federal regulation of matters relating to
generation . ..and of that part of such business
which consists of the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the
public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to
extend only to those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States.88
It would seem, then, that Congress intended FERC's
jurisdiction to begin only where the States' jurisdiction ends.
However, this is not actually the case. Through a broad definition
of interstate commerce, FERC's jurisdiction now extends signifi-
cantly into the spheres of the States.8 9 The Supreme Court's
8 Id.
See infra Part IV.
86 See infra Part II.B.-C.
87 See infra Part II.B.
88 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2000).
89 See infra this section.
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jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause ° tells practitioners that
the federal government may regulate the channels of interstate
commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and
"those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
91
The interconnected electric transmission grid can properly be seen
as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, according to most
modern commentators92 but, often the analysis ends there.93
To date, no party has made a Commerce Clause challenge
to FERC's jurisdiction.94 In fact, a Dormant Commerce Clause case
has been used to bolster FERC's jurisdiction.95 One commentator
goes on to say that despite FERC's (now) broad powers, "[cilearly
Congress intended to permit the states to continue to play a role in
transmission regulation."" In the late 1990s and the early twenty-
first century, there has been a fair amount of disagreement about
FERC's role.97 "Some utilities take the position that FERC has
usurped too much power in its regulation of transmission ....
Others believe that the FERC has not gone far enough in asserting
jurisdiction over bundled transmission. Several lawsuits have
attempted to clarify the scope of FERC's authority." s The question
for today, especially in light of Kentucky Power Co., is whether
there will be any state-based regulation of transmission at all. The
significant environmental consequences of transmission line siting,
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9 1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559 (1995) (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968)).
92 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 78. Robertson discusses the case of Wabash,
St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois as being a good example of a parallel
between railroad regulation and electricity regulation. She explains that if states
use insular policies to protect proprietary interests in the shipment of goods, as
was the case in Wabash, that the same type of behavior vis-A-vis the
transmission grid could cause similar damage. See Robertson, supra note 1, at




95 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 78-79.
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access issues, and deregulation policy in general reveal a need for
state involvement, as well as a significant state interest in making
policies related to transmission access.99
C. How Far Could FERC Go?
Judicial challenges to FERC's authority are few, but remain
notable. Jurisprudence on FERC's involvement in transmission
began in Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light
Co. 0 0 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the decisions of
the FPC were subject to the standard of review accorded to
independent administrative agencies-that of substantial defer-
ence if not arbitrary and capricious.I°1 This seemed reasonable, but
the case also began the jurisprudential chain in the interstate
commerce line of cases. The question was whether the FPC
exceeded its authority when asserting jurisdiction over Florida
Power & Light ("FP&L").102 The Commission claimed that FP&L
was transmitting energy in interstate commerce; however, "[all of
FP&L's equipment, including transmission lines, is confined to
Florida and none of its lines directly connect with. . . out-of-state
companies.""°3 One wonders how FP&L might be subject to the
FPC's interstate commerce jurisdiction. The Court goes on to say
" See William A. Borders, Note, Learning from the Storm: Lessons for Illinois
Following California's Experience with Electricity Restructuring, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 333, 362 (2001).
[FERC] does not have strong eminent domain authority in siting
transmission lines. As a result, projects for new transmission
can be quite complex, involving a multitude of federal, state, and
local agencies, and may take years to construct. Not
surprisingly, local communities are often reluctant to agree to
interstate construction designed to benefit customers and
investors in states other than their own.
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 362 nn.188-89.
100 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
101 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 463 (citing Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Fla.
Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971)).
112 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 453.
103 Id. at 456.
708
GETTING THE CAMEL OUT OF THE TENT
that "FP&L does, however, indirectly connect with out-of-state
companies. As a member of the Florida Pool, it is interconnected
with the Florida Power Corp., the Tampa Electric Co., the Orlando
Utilities Commission, and the City of Jacksonville." 1°4 The
relationships between power companies were the focal point of the
case for the majority.'1°
The dissent in the Florida Power & Light Co. case repre-
sents the reasoning that best conforms to the congressionally-
drafted statute.' 6 In FP&L's reasoning, and that of Justice
Douglas, the facts did not demonstrate that any of FP&L's power
flowed in interstate commerce, but rather merely affected it.'0 7
Congress could have, but did not, give the FPC any power over
transmission merely affecting or simply touching interstate
commerce.'0 ° Although the majority predicted that, "as intercon-
nections proliferate and energy pools grow larger .... the greater
the need for [federal] regulation [would be] ,"1o9 the dissent rightly
notes that this is purely a matter of statutory construction." 0
"While federal regulation was to be pervasive, once fastened onto
a company, Congress expressed an unambiguous policy to preserve
and to rely upon effective and adequate state regulation.""' Justice
Douglas quoted the committee report from the drafting of the
applicable federal legislation:
[tihe revised bill would impose Federal regulation
only over those matters which cannot effectively be
controlled by the States. The limitation on the Fed-
eral Power Commission's jurisdiction in this regard
104 Id. (citations omitted).
105 Id.
10 6 Id. at 462.
107 Id. at 462. Note that Justice Douglas did not use the term "substantially
affected" interstate commerce.
'
08 Id.; see also id. at n. 12 (noting Congress's "discriminating use of language" in
passing the Federal Power Act).
'
09 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 468.
110 Id.
... Id. at 474.
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has been inserted in each section in an effort to
prevent the expansion of Federal authority over State
matters. 112
In modern times, the line of cases holding that FERC could
extend its jurisdiction to those cases whose facts touched interstate
commerce only peripherally or tangentially has developed from
Florida Power & Light Co. and bloomed into an almost totally
federal regulatory regime." 3
D. Native Load Protection & Curtailment
In the case of Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d
1090 (8th Cir 1999), the court held that FERC could not regulate
native load curtailment"4 because FERC "ha[d] transgressed its
Congressional authority which limits its authority to interstate
transactions.... [I]ts attempt to regulate the curtailment of electrical
transmission on native/retail consumers is unlawful.... "" Robertson
then observed that "the case raised questions about the scope of
FERC's authority: to what extent can FERC actions over wholesale
transmission affect retail sales of electricity?"" 6 The effects to which
Robertson refers are those that FERC is having today-those that
indirectly affect retail service, but which are just related enough to
interstate commerce as to come within FERC jurisdiction."7 Some
commentators believe that the Eighth Circuit incorrectly decided
Northern States Power, and that the Court should have ruled in favor
112 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess., at 18) (emphasis in
original quotation omitted; quotation marks omitted).
113 See generally infra Part III.
14 Native load curtailment refers to the lowering or cutting off of power to the
native load of that geographic area. See supra note 10.
115 Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090, 1096 (8th Cir. 1999),
reh'g en banc denied 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23494 (8th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999), cert.
denied sub nom. Enron Power Mktg., Inc. v. Northern States Power Co., 528
U.S. 1182 (2000).
1 Robertson, supra note 1, at 79 (emphasis added).
117 See id. & Part II.B.-C.
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of FERC and held that the indirect effect on native load would have
been proper.
118
A string of cases affirming FERC's ability to regulate the
nation's transmission grid came closer in time to the Kentucky
Power Co. case. The courts have held that everything on the grid
is in interstate commerce. First came Transmission Access Policy
Study Group v. FERC."9 In this case, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that because commingling of electricity from various
states could be considered a transaction in interstate commerce,
FERC had authority to regulate it. 2 ° This decision applied
regardless of whether the transactions were at retail or at
wholesale.12
More important than the Transmission Access Policy Study
Group case is its appeal, New York v. FERC,'22 where the Supreme
Court finally gave stakeholders a handhold, however loose, on the
definition of interstate transmission.'23 In New York v. FERC, the
State of New York argued that FERC "has no power to regulate
unbundled retail sales because they are intrastate transmission
and therefore outside of FERC's realm. FERC argues that these
transactions are part of interstate-not intrastate-transmission,
which it has the power to regulate."'24 As Robertson states, "[t]he
main question, then, is whether such transmission is better
characterized as intrastate or interstate."'25
The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit in Transmission
Access Policy Study Group, and allowed FERC's Order 888 to stand.126
Robertson, and other commentators at that time, seemed to be
casting odds in favor of New York, based on their view that the
Federal Power Act ostensibly laid out such clear jurisdictional
118 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 1, at 80.
119 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
120 Id. at 694 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co.).
121 id.
122 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
123 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 81.
124 id.
12 1 Id. (quotations omitted).
126 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002).
20061
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 30:691
guidelines. 2 ' The petitioners, including New York and an electric
utility, brought an action challenging FERC's Order 888, which
ended discriminatory treatment of non-incumbent affiliated
utilities.'28 The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which explained that the
plain language of the FPA readily supported FERC's jurisdiction. 129
Further, "the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the
enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was 'neatly
divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales."'"3" The Supreme
Court continued, explaining that "Section 201(b) of the FPA states
that FERC's jurisdiction includes the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce' and 'the sale of electric energy at wholesale
in interstate commerce."" 3 From this follows an odd twist of logic:
"[tihe unbundled retail transmission targeted by FERC are indeed
transmissions of 'electric energy in interstate commerce' because of
the nature of the national grid." 3 2 Practitioners had heard this before,
and the Court makes a brief comparison of the electric transmission
jurisdiction of the FERC with its natural gas jurisdiction.133 The
Court continues with the chief rationale for its holding: 'There is no
language in the statute limiting FERC's transmission jurisdiction to
the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC's sale
jurisdiction to that at wholesale."" The Supreme Court had extended
FERC's power to new depths. Now, not only does FERC have
judicially-mandated power over transmission policymaking, 3 5 but the
effect of its rulemaking can extend into the retail market as well.
127 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 84-85.
128 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002).
129 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 84.
13' New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 16 (citations omitted). This author returns to
his previous point made in the introduction-should not Congress make these
sorts of policy pronouncements? See supra text accompanying note 1, regarding
Fla. Power & Light Co.
' Robertson, supra note 1, at 16-17 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000))
(citations omitted).
132 Id. at 17 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000)) (citations omitted).
133 Id. at 17.
114 Id. (citations omitted).
131 See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
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The Court also discusses issues regarding preemption,
taking time to point out that in a situation where states have
traditionally regulated, there is a presumption against federal
preemption, and noting that "[i] n such a situation, the Court starts
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superceded .. .unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."" 6 After paying mere lip service to
Congress's intent, the Supreme Court refers to its previous
statutory analysis as "straightforward."'37 The Court's discussion
of the presumption ultimately carried no weight.
E. Does the Decision in New York v. FERC Render Northern
States Power Co. Bad Law?
These recent developments call into question whether the
decision in New York v. FERC now makes the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Northern States Power bad law. The stated goal of
FERC in Order 888 was "to bring more efficient, lower cost power
to the Nation's electricity consumers." 3 ' Northern States Power,
in its written submissions to the court, asserted that "the direct
effect of FERC's curtailment orders will cause a nonjurisdictional
disruption of service affecting [Northern States Power Co.'s]
native/retail customers."'39
The fundamental issue to be decided on this appeal is
whether FERC may, through its tariff orders, require
[Northern States Power Co.], a public utility, to curtail
electrical transmission to wholesale (point-to-point)
136 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 18 (quoting Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707,715 (1985)) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
13 Id. at 20 (describing Petitioner's (New York's) argument that an extension of
FERC's jurisdiction in this manner would be contrary to the original intent of
the congressional drafters that the FPA, as amended, would only be a gap-filling
measure, not intended to supplant any traditionally state-held jurisdiction).
118 Northern States Power Co., 176 F.3d at 1091 (citation omitted).
139 Id. at 1092-93.
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customers on a comparable basis with its native/retail
customers when it experiences power constraints.
FERC acknowledges that it cannot permissibly affect
state regulation of retail rates and practices. FERC
argues that it has simply required that, as to trans-
mission curtailment, [Northern States Power Co.] may
not discriminate against a third party in favor of its
own native/retail customers. 14°
In Northern States Power, then, the effect of FERC's Order 888 was
to reach down into Northern States Power Co.'s vertical monopoly
and indirectly affect the company's relationship with consumers,
who require an uninterrupted power supply at a retail rate.1
4
'
FERC responded by arguing that it does "not operate in a
vacuum"142 and that it was "not exercising its regulatory powers
directly,' ' 43 but rather was enforcing a federal tariff." The court
held that "it is fundamental that this court must first satisfy itself
that FERC has Congressional approval to regulate [Northern
States Power Co.] ... Congress has drawn a bright line between
state and federal regulation."'4 5 Finally, the court "[thought] it
obvious that the indirect effect of Order No. 888 ... is an attempt
to regulate curtailment of electric power to [Northern State Power
Co.'s] native/retail consumers."" The Eighth Circuit remanded the
case back to the Commission "so as to not encroach upon the
authority of the regulatory commissions of the states."147
Despite the holding in Northern States Power, the Supreme
Court effectively invalidated the Eighth Circuit's "reaching down"
reasoning that limited FERC in accordance with its congressional
140 Id. at 1093.
141 See id. at 1094-96.
142 Id. at 1095.
143 Id.
144 Id. The federal tariff which FERC was enforcing was derived directly from
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mandate.'" In New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court allowed
FERC to target retail transmission.'4 9 Notably, the court relied on
New York v. FERC in the most recent Kentucky Power case, using
it as the basis for upholding and applying FERC's Order 888 to the
states. 50 The court in Kentucky Power indicated that New York v.
FERC was an unparalleled authority that transmission and
curtailment anywhere on the interstate grid constituted an action in
interstate commerce that FERC could regulate.' 5' In light of these
decisions, any regulation of transmission, regardless of whether it
significantly and substantially affects native or retail load, now
appears subject to regulation by FERC. The reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit does not necessarily track with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in each of the cases, that is, New York v. FERC did not
directly overrule Northern States Power Co. whatever modicum of
protection previously appeared to be available to states and their
public utility commissions under Northern States Power Co. and
similar lines of reasoning is now unavailable. Any regulation of
curtailment that might "encroach upon the authority of the regula-
tory commissions of the States" 1 2 now seems to be allowed.
F. Economic Arguments for Federalization
Wresting transmission policy away from the state govern-
ments was not just a matter of modern Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, such as that from United States v. Lopez, 5 superimposed
over the Federal Power Act.' It was also based upon an economic
148See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
149 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 3 (2002).150 Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (2005).
151 Id. at 781-83, nn.2-3, 787 (2005). Ky. Power Co. has been favorably cited by
FERC. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 114 F.E.R.C. 61,282,2006 FERC LEXIS
605, *125-26 (2006); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 111 F.E.R.C.
61,367, 62,593, 2005 FERC LEXIS 1526 (2006).
152 Northern States Power Co., 176 F.3d at 1096.
153 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (the Lopez case is generally considered to be the starting
point of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence by the Rehnquist Court).
114 There is a primary issue of statutory interpretation in light of the Commerce
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argument that efficiency could be achieved by the pooling of
resources and centralization of control. This policy argument began
during the deregulation of the airline industry, interstate trucking
industry, and telecommunications industry. 5' The application of
efficiency through market forces and competition can not easily be
done in the electric industry.'56
In addition to taking a closer look at "government regulation
and bureaucracy," 15 7 economic theories have "also exposed other
warts, such as regulation's tendencies to cross-subsidize high cost
consumers by imposing higher rates to low-cost consumers."5 8
These notions are not economic flights of theoretical fancy; there
is some truth to arguments that economic theories akin to laissez-
Clause. There are also secondary issues. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation that statutes be accorded their plain meaning. "In
determining the meaning of a statute, a court generally looks to its words and
gives them their usual and ordinary meaning. Or as sometimes stated, in
construing a statute, words must be taken in their usual, normal, or customary
meaning." 73 AM. JUR. 2d, Statutes, § 124 (2004) (citations omitted). See, e.g.,
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 70
Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 949 P.2d 1 (1998), as modified (Feb. 25, 1998) and Yonkings
v. Wilkinson, 86 Ohio St. 3d 225, 714 N.E.2d 394 (1999); see also Rice v.
CertainTeed Corp., 84 Ohio St. 3d 417, 704 N.E.2d 1217 (1999), cited in 73 AM.
JUR. 2d, Statutes, § 124 n.2 (standing for the principle that in assessing the
language employed by the legislature, a court must take words at their usual,
normal, or customary meaning). Some have argued that the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of the Federal Power Act has created a federal behemoth
at the expense of the States and Congress's intention that the states remain
primarily in control of transmission policy. Furthermore, the FERC's assertion
ofjurisdiction comes from the very interconnection that it seeks to regulate. See
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) and Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S.
453, 92 S. Ct. 633, 30 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1972); see also id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
155 See supra Part I, notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
156 See Koch, supra note 32, at 572. "Three discrete bodies of law shape the
electric utility industry: physics, economics, and society. The laws of physics
that govern electricity are inflexible, leaving economics and society to adapt.
Therein lies the complexity of restructuring the electric utility industry." Id.
(citations omitted).
157 John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring,
25 ENERGY L.J. 273 (2004).
158 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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faire can be successfully applied to traditionally heavily-regulated
industries.159 However, the economic theories of regulation that now
dominate the thinking of both industry and units of government are
directly opposed to a public interest theory of regulation. 60 The
public interest theory of regulation "starts from the uncontroversial
normative proposition that regulation should occur when necessary
to address 'market failures' such as natural monopoly ... "1"
According to the public interest theory, if a market is
a natural monopoly, the public will demand industry
regulation because the best solution is not achievable
in the absence of regulation. Unfettered competition
will result in excessive pricing and/or too many firms
producing, thus exceeding a socially optimal level.
Net welfare gains result by industry regulation, and
this potential for welfare gains generates the public's
demand for regulation.'62
It is this potential for "welfare gains" that has girded the idea of
public utility regulation for many prior decades.'63 Since the
transmitting and selling of electricity is affected with a public
interest,'6 it seems reasonable that a public interest theory be
used to regulate the industry.
III. BUT WHY CAN'T THE STATES Do IT?
Judge Issac Benkin, in his article on the virtues of federal
jurisdiction over transmission access, describes the traditional
159 Id.
160 Id. at 278.
161 Id. (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
162 Id. at 279 (footnote omitted).
163 Id.
1"4 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000); see also Evans B. Brasfield, Regulation of Electric
Utilities by the State Corporation Commission, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 589, 591
(1973) (describing the traditional reasons for regulation, including the failure of
unbridled competition, and discussing the public's need for electricity).
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arguments that states have asserted in support of their efforts to
control transmission policy.'65 He also addresses the issue raised
by Section 201166 of the Federal Power Act:
Some proponents of state regulatory jurisdiction over
transmission access have noted that section 201 of the
FPA specifically restricts the scope of federal regula-
tion "to extend only to those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the States," and have focussed
[sic] on the Act's declaration that "electric energy shall
be held to be transmitted in interstate commerce if
transmitted from a State and consumed at any point
outside thereof.. ." Based upon this language, they
argue that state commissions may regulate "intra-
state" transmission which is said to consist of trans-
mission of electricity produced by a generating facility
within the state to loads located in the same state.
Precedent, as well as physics, demonstrates that this
argument is unlikely to be successful.'6 7
Benkin goes on to defend the holding in Florida Power & Light
that all electricity with even the potential of crossing state lines is
in interstate commerce.' 8 This now appears to be a foregone
conclusion with the decision in New York v. FERC. "It seems to
follow," argues Benkin, "that the FERC has regulatory jurisdiction
over transmission service performed by a utility connected to the
interstate network. This description fits virtually all
utilities.... "169 Precedent certainly supports Benkin's argument.
Physics also supports Benkin to the extent that he claims that
electricity moving over transmission lines does not do so in a direct
path, from point A to B, but rather by means of a pool-like effect
165 See generally Isaac D. Benkin, Who Makes the Rules? Federal and State
Jurisdiction Over Electric Transmission Access, 13 ENERGY L.J. 45 (1992).
166 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000).
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with deposits and withdrawals to and from a general source. 7 °
However, Benkin, a former FERC Administrative Law Judge,
speaks from a position of bias in relation to the federal system. 7'
The FERC's jurisdiction over the interstate network only exists
because the Supreme Court says that it does. 72 In the first of the
major jurisdictional cases, Florida Power & Light Co., the Federal
Power Commission asserted jurisdiction over a utility whose
interstate commercial activity was two steps removed from the
state line between Florida and Georgia. 73 Benkin asserts that one
argument for the States to regulate transmission policy is that
'Ibiecause the FERC lacks jurisdiction to direct utilities to perform
transmission service, so the argument runs, there is a regulatory
'gap' that the states are free to fill."'74 As true as it might be that
there remains a gap in the regulation, this argument ultimately
misses the point. The FERC is designed to fill in regulation only
after the States have regulated. The gap-filling argument should
work in the opposite direction if we were to look at the original
legislation and its intent. 75
Additional arguments asserted by proponents of State
regulation include: (i) that the state has primary jurisdiction over
the planning and operation of the transmission system; 176 (ii) that
170 See Koch, supra note 32, at 572-73.
171 The FERC has suffered from this sort of bias in the past. See Northern States
Power Co., 176 F.3d at 1096.
172 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
173 See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 456-57
(explaining that as a member of the "Florida Pool," FP&L connects to Florida
Power Corp. (among other utilities) which then interconnects to Georgia Power
Co. and "regularly exchanges power with it. Georgia's lines transmit the power
out of or into Florida").
174 Benkin, supra note 165, at 51 (citations omitted).
175 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000); see also Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
176 This argument, among the three mentioned as alternatives to the strict
statutory construction issue, supra, is probably the most meritorious of the three.
States have, historically, retained primary jurisdiction over transmission line
siting issues, and as sovereigns of the land on which the transmission lines sit,
have played a vital role in the siting process through their public utility
commissions; see also Borders, supra note 99, at 360.
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state action will enhance competition; and (iii) that state action to
regulate will carry out the purposes of federal legislation, from a
policy standpoint, at least as well as FERC could. 177 These
arguments are all meritorious, though Judge Benkin disputes each
one with vigor. In the end, Judge Benkin advocates a policy from
the federal level because the FERC is better suited to "make the
rules" for everyone, even if it did not jump at the chance when
deregulation was just beginning.17' Benkin posits that solutions
promulgated by early state entrepreneurs, such as California, in
attempts to lead deregulatory efforts were extra-jurisdictional, and
that FERC should have stepped into efforts to deregulate the
industry much earlier.'79 He agrees with Justice Marshall noting
that Marshall's notion that "the regulation of matters vital to the
national economy cannot be left to the parochial supervision of the
several states," remains valid today.8 0
Benkin's argument concludes: "[t]he FERC is the adminis-
trative agency vested with the responsibility for exercising that
national perspective. It, not the state commissions, should be the
institution making the rules for transmission access. The time has
come for FERC to get on with that task."' But now that FERC
has gotten on with the task in Orders 888 and 2000, to what end?
The federal camel now has both of its humps and its posterior in
the state tent.
IV. STATE DEFENSES TO THE FEDERAL CAMEL-A KENTUCKY
STATUTE LEADS TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT
NATIVE LOAD PROTECTION
A new challenge has arisen to states trying to protect their
stake in transmission policy-the Dormant Commerce Clause.
177 Benkin, supra note 165, at 52.
178 See Benkin, supra note 165, at 59-60.
179 id.
180 Id. at 60 (noting this opinion was that of Chief Justice John Marshall when
contemplating the federal role in "our great constitutional scheme"). One can
only wonder whose side the Great Chief Justice would have taken in Florida
Power & Light.
181 Benkin, supra note 165, at 60.
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With the rush into RTOs and "deregulation" progressing rapidly at
the state and federal levels, Kentucky passed a statute designed to
give the state native load protection, which assures priority for its
own customers in cases of overloads on the regional system
elsewhere." 2 The Kentucky statute, entitled "Curtailment of
service by utility or generation and transmission cooperative,"
states as follows:
When a utility or generation and transmission
cooperative engaged in the transmission of electricity
experiences on its transmission facilities an emer-
gency or other event that necessitates a curtailment
or interruption of service, the utility or generation
and transmission cooperative shall not curtail or
interrupt retail electric service within its certified
territory, or curtail or interrupt wholesale electric
energy furnished to a member distribution coopera-
tive for retail electric service within the cooperative's
certified territory, except for customers who have
agreed to receive interruptable [sic] service, until
after service has been interrupted to all other cus-
tomers whose interruption may relieve the emer-
gency or other event.
8 3
The states have a right to do this. The constitutional question
comes full circle to the issues of interstate commerce: should the
door that the Supreme Court opened in Florida Power & Light Co.
now be the basis for a constitutional challenge to the statutory
authority of the States? The court in Kentucky Power Co. ruled
that it can. 8 4
Based on the Commerce Clause, the district court in
Kentucky Power Co. held that the Kentucky statute was unconsti-
tutional because it provided a curtailment preference only to
182 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.214 (2004).
183 Id.
18 4 See Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 784-87 (2005).
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Kentucky customers and disadvantaged all similarly situated
customers outside of Kentucky. l"5 The statute gave Kentucky
residents a preferred right of access to transmission service so that
Kentucky service would not be diverted because of problems
elsewhere on the regional network.' The foregoing circumstances
create a fundamental problem that combines erroneous federal
jurisdictional jurisprudence and the market approaches to electric
transmission validated in New York v. FERC. On one end of the
spectrum, there is the line of cases beginning with Florida Power
& Light Co. and ending in New York v. FERC that extend FERC's
jurisdiction to the maximum possible extent, and on the other end,
there is a deregulatory approach emphasizing market economics
that the Supreme Court has validated. These two factors operate
to deprive the states of both the statutory jurisdiction envisioned
by Congress, and the efforts to create market protection at the
retail level.
"The [D] ormant Commerce Clause is the principle that state
and local laws are unconstitutional if they discriminate against or
unduly burden interstate commerce.' 8 7 The district court had to
decide whether the state law affected interstate commerce, and,
relying on New York v. FERC, the court ruled that it did.' Under
the current jurisprudential regime, all activity that touches the
"interconnected national grids constitute a transmission in
interstate commerce."8 9 In its Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the court then went on to ask whether the state law
prohibiting curtailment of Kentucky's native load customers, until
other non-native customers had suffered curtailment, discrimi-
nated against out-of-staters. 9 ° The court concluded that it did,
noting that "[a] regulation that burdens interstate commerce is
presumed to be invalid if it is found to be discriminatory."' 9 ' In
185 Id.
186 See id.
1 7 Id. at 785 (citing GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)).
18s Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (2005).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. (citing Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (1992)).
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concluding its Commerce Clause analysis, the court held that "KRS
278.214 violates the [Dormant Commerce Clause because it
provides curtailment preference only to Kentucky customers and
disadvantages all similarly situated customers located outside
Kentucky borders." 92
The operative question appears to be whether all state
actions that try to protect native load are unconstitutional in light
of the current jurisprudential regime of New York v. FERC and its
predecessors, especially with Kentucky Power Company operating
as a guide? Though yet unchallenged, settlement agreements
through which the RTO voluntarily agrees to native load protec-
tion and curtailment preferences may not suffer from this same
constitutional ailment. At least some state actions attempting to
protect native load may be unconstitutional. 1
93
192 Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (2005).
193 See the Stipulation Entered Into as Part of the Order Granting Approval for
Appalachian Power Company d/b/a American Electric Power to join PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., an RTO. Order Granting Approval in Case No. PUE-
2000-00550 (Aug. 30,2004), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/news/2000-
550.pdf. Paragraph 6(c) of the Stipulation was ordered to be entered as follows:
The foregoing curtailment protocols [providing protection to
Virginia's native load customers] shall apply except in
extraordinary circumstances such as where load shedding
[cutting off power or turning it down by reducing demand on the
generating facility] would be beneficial to prevent separation
from the Eastern Interconnection, prevent voltage collapse or in
order to restore frequency following a system collapse.
Id. at 4 of Stipulation. It is noteworthy that several participants in the Virginia
proceedings for this particular company, Appalachian Power, were worried that
even the Stipulation, with at least some provision for native load protection, would
not provide enough native load protection. One witness testified that he was
concerned that the Stipulation "gives PJM carte blanche authority to cut-off [sic]
power to Virginia at any time." Id. at 17 of Order Granting Approval. Further, this
same witness "believes that there is great risk to the general public, and that
Virginia consumers have the best protection, as to adequacy of service and as to
rates, with continued maximum regulation by the [Virginia State Corporation]
Commission." Id. The Commission stated, almost lamentably, that its hands were
tied by the nature of the Virginia statute, which mandated RTO membership and
did not allow for a public interest inquiry to be made. Id. at 19. For further debate
and opinion surrounding the case of Virginia, see generally Samuel R. Brumberg,
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V. THE FUTURE STATE OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN
TRANSMISSION POLICY
In recent years, federal preemption under newer legislation
has elevated the role of FERC beyond simply a wholesale power
regulator to that of a key agency with the development of Regional
Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), the super entities that are
now responsible for the interoperability of the nation's power
grid.'94 Federal policymakers contend that this move will increase
reliability, lower costs, and increase competition in a nationalized
power market.'95
Those hopeful wishes notwithstanding, many issues remain
in converting the natural regulated monopolies of electric utilities
to the rigors of a market-based system. While some view the moves
to a market-based system with great optimism, some are justifi-
ably skeptical.'96
[A]pplying the same market approach to the trans-
mission segment is problematic because electricity is
an undifferentiated product that cannot be efficiently
stored and cannot be directed from a source of pro-
duction to any specific end-user. Thus, the overarch-
ing task is to structure the transmission segment of
the electric utility industry in a way that does not
endanger the market solutions at work in the genera-
tion and distribution segments. 97
The problem with RTOs, and with the New York v. FERC
precedent, is that they allow the federal government to impose upon
the States a regulatory regime that they, the States, may find
Energy Choice in Virginia: Another Perspective on Consumer Choice (Apr. 16,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
194See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
195 See generally Benkin, supra note 165.
196 See Koch, supra note 32, at 570.
197 Koch, supra note 32, at 570-71.
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unsuitable. 9 ' Electricity before deregulation was a vertically-
integrated industry: one company, a natural monopoly, was
responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution
functions.'9 9 The vertically-integrated monopoly was predisposed to
abuses, so it was heavily regulated. 2°° The modern problem with a
deregulated market, full of both utility generators and NUGs, is
that the laws of physics do not allow the RTO framework to actually
transmit electricity from point A to point B.20 ' We have simply
grafted an energy trading market onto the existing pooled system.
A. Benefits to Regional Coordination
There are benefits to coordination among various utilities.
In emergencies, we want to be able to have utilities contribute
electricity to one another to protect consumers from the dangers
and inconveniences of power outages. Does such activity, however,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce? 202 "The dominant
198 See Order 2000, supra note 73. See supra note 193, describing how the
Virginia State Corporation Commission felt its hands were tied in approving a
Stipulation regarding an RTO.
199 See Koch, supra note 32, at 572-73.
200 See Koch, supra note 32, at 573; see also Brasfield, supra note 164.
201 See supra Part II; see also Koch, supra note 32, at 573 nn.13-14.
202 The problem may be one of degree.
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state
statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously
stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443) (emphasis added; citations omitted). But see id. at
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approach to restructuring the transmission segment of the ...
industry" is to "place management, if not ownership and operation,
in the hands of an independent entity."
20 3
An ISO has two complimentary roles: (1) 'daily opera-
tion' of a specified transmission grid, the scope of
which can be controversial, and (2) implementation
of a 'bidding system that would determine which
generators provide power to the grid' at any given
price and 'point in time' .... [T]he ISO would opti-
mize transmission capacity so that the least costly
electricity flows to the consumers who value it the
most.
20 4
The ability of an entire region to coordinate operation of its
transmission grid, and possibly provide power to other utilities in
cases of dire need or emergency, is a positive element of regional
coordination. However, this does not mean that the benefits of
regional coordination cannot be regulated by states, via joint or
regional boards or perhaps even by interstate compacts.
B. What's Wrong with a Little Discrimination?
The issue of RTOs goes beyond the Supreme Court's
decisions in Florida Power & Light Co. and New York v. FERC.
The overarching policy is one of non-discriminatory transmission
access that, in turn, enables the energy market to operate. The
idea of non-discriminatory transmission via the federal OATTs as
ordered in Order 888, in addition to the system of RTOs envisioned
in Order 2000 and currently coming into existence, is alive and
145 (holding that state statutes requiring business operations to be performed
in the home state, which could more efficiently be performed elsewhere, are
viewed with particular suspicion. This decision also holds that even when a state
is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on
commerce has been declared to be almost per se illegal).
203 Koch, supra note 32, at 579-80.
204 Id. at 580 (quotations omitted).
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well.2 °5 Only time will tell whether the policies of FERC, handed
down and arguably forced upon the states, will prove to be
beneficial to the consumers of electricity who, through the system
of regulated natural monopolies, subsidized much of the construc-
tion used to serve them. Because electric service is "affected with
a public interest,"2 6 the benefit to the public-that is, to electricity
consumers-should be the measure by which success is judged.
Intricately and inextricably connected to the public interest
is the idea of native load protection.2 °7 States are still seeking to
find their way and determine their role in light of the current state
of the law and the economics affecting the public utility industry.2 8
Whether by statute or by contractual agreement, states must find
ways to become more than entities to which utilities must submit
reports, or from which FERC receives reports, comments, and
recommendations, or to which FERC gives notices. 2 9 The state
public utility commissioners are regulators, nothing more and
nothing less. Discrimination, while perhaps economically unfash-
ionable, need not be viewed as being unfair. The ratepayers-a
particular state's utility consumers-ultimately subsidized the
building of the equipment that serves them, and the state govern-
ments should tolerate discrimination not only for equitable
purposes, but also in the interests of public safety.210
CONCLUSION
"In this area, as in so many others, the choice of regulatory
forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy.
205 It should be noted that the Federal Power Act prohibits only "undue"
discrimination, not all discrimination. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a)-(b) & 824e(a) (2000).
206 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000).
207 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
208 See supra this section & infra Conclusion.
209 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(a) & 824a-1 (2000).
210 For example, state regulators should be able to exercise an oversight function
related to outages, blackouts, and emergencies on the transmission lines
covering their states. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970) and Brasfield, supra note 164.
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That may explain why Americans have traditionally shed so much
metaphorical and genuine blood deciding what are essentially
jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions. " 211
Judge Benkin expresses, succinctly, that jurisdictional problems
are important problems, and his article notes that they must be
examined.2 12 Both the federal and state governments have "found
themselves caught up in changing fashions of economic theory."
213
This problem of law and society, 214 has developed into the current
deregulatory regime that we see both in the state legislatures and
public utility commissions.
However, doing what is fashionable has also led to problems.
The Supreme Court has often fallen prey to this desire. The rules
have changed since Judge Benkin penned that
[tihis situation places utilities in a dilemma. They
must continue to do business under the regulatory
aegis of the state commissions. These agencies have
vast discretion over retail rates and utility decisions
to construct generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion facilities. Faced with the uncertainty of vindicat-
ing their possible legal defenses and the certainty of
an important and powerful agency hell-bent on
implementing a transmission access scheme, utilities
may be excused if they decline the honor of inscribing
their names in the lawbooks in the titles of test cases.
The result is that state regulatory agencies exercise
real influence over transmission access matters, an
influence that far exceeds the theoretical scope of
their limited jurisdictional reach. Utilities rightly
believe that it is perilous to ignore the state commis-
211 Benkin, supra note 165, at 46.
212 Id.
213 Id. See generally Moot, supra note 157 (explaining varying hypotheses
regarding the economic theories upon which deregulation is based and positing,
interestingly, that deregulation might have as one of its impetuses the
withdrawal of support for traditional regulation by power producers).
214 See Koch, supra note 32.
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sions' desires with respect to interstate transmission
matters.215
The situation has become such that the state commissions are now
afterthoughts, rubber stamping policies that have taken root at the
whimsy of state legislatures and FERC. A move towards deregula-
tion has come at the expense of placing authority for transmission
policy in the hands of state governments, where it belongs. Thanks
to the jurisprudence begun in Florida Power & Light Co. and
ended in New York v. FERC, we have a federal administrative
agency acting questionably in the face of its own enabling statute
and we are seemingly content to let this happen. Further, states
that try to undertake protective measures in the form of a statu-
tory mandate in the public interest find themselves up against a
high constitutional burden.216
One now-retired state public utility commissioner character-
ized the problem facing the states:217 "[FERC's vision] must be
recognized for what it is: a public policy initiative that fundamen-
tally re-orders and restructures an industry that is the lifeblood of
our economy."21 8 Commissioner Moore argues that one basis of
"sound public policy is to increase net social welfare," and that
because electricity is a necessity for our modern lives, we should
aspire to a public service model of regulation.1 9
Our goal should be an industry that provides reliable
service at reasonable rates with the electricity
produced and delivered in an environmentally re-
sponsible manner. Once the goal is established, the
goal becomes the polar star. Each action we take, or
215 Benkin, supra note 165, at 48-49.
216 See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
217 The Honorable Hullihen Williams Moore, The Blackout of 2003: What Is
Next?: Transmission Investment, Restructuring, and the Future of the Electric
Utility Industry: Competition: The Wrong Goal, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 739 (2005)
(symposium remarks).21 8 Id. at 741.
219 id.
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fail to take, can, and should, be fairly judged by
whether it moves us toward, or away from, that goal.
This approach is critical to the current public policy
debate in the electric industry. Once the goal is
established, our discussion is then about the means
to achieve the goal. The means do not become the
goal. Thus, competition cannot become the goal, but
rather the means to achieve our goal for the electric
industry. In like manner, regulation cannot become
the goal.22 °
FERC's current exuberance about a market-driven system has
unforeseen costs and risks that have not been fully investigated.2 2'
Costs of RTO administration may be "hundreds of millions of
dollars."222 "As FERC and others have moved forward with
competition, they have lost sight of the goal. Instead of reliable
service at reasonable rates and environmental responsibility,
FERC has made mere competition its goal."223
The federal camel now appears to be permanently inside the
state tent. No one seems to know when it will leave. To what end?
"[Slaying 'there will be winners and losers' is not enough. You
must look out not just for corporate America, not just for the ISOs,
RTOs, and utilities, but for the people as well."224
220Id.
221 Id. at 741-46.
2 22 Id. at 747.
221 Moore, supra note 217, at 749.
224 Id. at 751 (quotations omitted).
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